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Abstract  
The aim of this paper is to contribute to an innovative agenda in the field of Environmental 
Economics. The paper focusses on a conceptual and political perspective on the interactions 
between nature and economy. Section 1 states that Environmental Economics has to 
consider three fields: nature, justice and the role of time. To operationalize this claim, we 
introduce fundamental concepts such as entropy, joint production, ignorance, evolution, 
absolute scarcity, responsibility and homo politicus and explain them in Section 2. These 
concepts are applied in Section 3 using a historical example, namely the soda-chlorine 
industry, extending over a period of about three centuries. The lessons taken from this 
economic, environmental and political evolution are outlined in Section 4. In Section 5, we 
apply the concept of responsibility to address political aspects dealt with when examining 
the interplay between nature and economy. In our outlook in Section 6, we argue that these 
concepts and further concepts do not form a hierarchically structured system. Instead they 
are conceived as a network of interdependent concepts that reference each other but also 
remain categorically distinct from one another. 
JEL Classification B4, B5, D72, Q50, Q 53, Q55, Q57 
Key words: absolute and relative scarcity, evolution, joint production, ignorance, 
responsibility, power of judgment, homo politicus 
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1. Introduction: Central aspects of environmental problems: nature, 
justice and time  
Rethinking the field of environmental economics in a visionary and perhaps provocative 
way demands that the research agenda deals with three fields: nature, justice and time. 
These dimensions are so encompassing that it is necessary to show how they can be 
approached in an operational way. This paper attempts to contribute to this task. We shall 
do this by developing an approach which is based on fundamental concepts such as 
absolute scarcity, evolution, ignorance, joint production based on thermodynamics, 
responsibility, power of judgment and a new understanding of human behavior, the homo 
politicus. This demands knowledge from different fields. We note that “in modern times, 
the sciences give us access to all of these fields. No single individual can master all of those 
sciences at once. Even if there were such a universal genius with outstanding expertise in 
economics, law, the social sciences and the natural sciences, especially physics, biology 
and chemistry, that individual still would not possess the skills to bring all of that 
knowledge together into a comprehensive understanding or help achieve such a 
comprehensive understanding and its network of concepts” (Faber et al. 2018: 6). 
The concepts we propose provide an interdisciplinary approach to environmental problems 
and make it possible to identify and systematically organize the knowledge necessary to 
solve these problems. In doing so, the complexity of environmental-economic interaction 
can be reduced. The challenge is thereby transformed into concrete questions and made 
accessible in practical terms for environmental policy measures. We will argue on 
theoretical, historical, economic, natural scientific, ethical and political levels.  
After explaining the six concepts mentioned above in Section 2, we will illustrate them 
with a historical example, the development of the soda-chlorine industry ranging over a 
period of 300 years, from 1750-2050 (Section 3). In Section 4 we show the lessons that can 
be drawn from the temporal structure of the economic environmental interactions, 
ignorance, scope of the problems, the actors behind them, and their solutions. 
In Section 5, we apply the concept of responsibility to address problems occurring in the 
interplay between nature and economy. Since the ability of individuals to assume 
individual responsibility is narrowly limited by their ignorance, another dimension of 
responsibility needs to be employed: political responsibility. The latter takes into account 
a central challenge for effective environmental policy, the occurrence of ignorance and 
even irreducible ignorance. In order to deal with it, the faculty of power of judgment is 
introduced and assigned to the homo politicus. The latter does not substitute but 
complement the homo oeconomicus model. In our outlook in Section 6, we argue that these 
concepts do not form a hierarchically structured system. Instead they are conceived as a 
network of interdependent concepts that reference each other but also remain categorically 
distinct from one another (Faber et al. 2018). From this follows that it is important to find 
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further concepts to reduce the complexity of environmental issues and structure existing 
knowledge, thus enabling policymakers to be guided by responsibility when taking 
practical action. 
2. The concepts 
In our past research we have worked with about 15 general concepts that are fundamental 
to understanding the world (see Faber et al. 2018). They are constitutive concepts of nature, 
such as entropy, and concepts from the social sciences like homo politicus. In this section 
we want to limit ourselves to six of them and explain their fruitfulness by using them to 
examine the interaction of nature and economy by illustration of the soda-chlorine industry.  
First, we turn to the notion of absolute and relative scarcity. Thereafter, we explain a 
central concept in the field of time, that of evolution. In almost all our previous studies on 
the impact of the economy on the environment, time has played a prominent role (e.g. cf., 
Faber, Proops in cooperation with Manstetten 1998; Faber Proops Speck in cooperation 
with Jöst 1999; Klauer et al., 2017). In doing so, we have repeatedly found that not only 
are knowledge and novelty relevant for our research, but above all the explicit consideration 
of ignorance as well. 
Two of the six concepts are of particular importance in this paper; the concepts of 
production, especially joint production, and responsibility since they “attempt to capture 
the physical and the moral side of economic production. Both terms exhibit a structural 
relatedness, which is why they are especially well suited to more precisely define the 
requirements of practical politics in their relationship to the environment. Finding such 
concepts or principles is always a matter of judgment  (Klauer et al. 2017: Chapter 7) 
because these concepts cannot be deduced from a series of potentially different types of 
observations. The power of judgment, our fifth concept, has the ability to reflect on such 
possible principles that may allow us to understand differing fields and how they are 
interrelated” (Faber et al. 2018:  6). Finally, we come to our human actors, the homo 
oeconomicus and homo politicus. 
Absolute and Relative Scarcity 
The concept of absolute scarcity of nature was introduced into classical economic thought 
by Thomas Robert Malthus. Examples of absolute scarcity are water in a desert or water 
and food in a besieged castle. Similarly we experience today that certain environmental 
goods are becoming scarcer and scarcer, as is the case in the loss of biodiversity 
(Baumgärtner et al. 2006a). 
Economics prominently employs another type of scarcity: the concept of relative scarcity, 
i.e. a good is scarce in relation to other scarce goods. Scarce goods have a positive price. 
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The price of non-scarce goods is zero. The use of relative scarcity implies that each good 
can be substituted. As the example of the loss of biodiversity shows, this is not always the 
case. The same holds for the consequences of climate change, such as water scarcity or 
regular flooding. Here we are talking of absolute scarcity. The longer the time period, the 
more urgent is the phenomenon of absolute scarcity. 
Evolution 
While the concept of space is relatively easy to grasp, the concept of time is much more 
difficult to perceive. The nature of time has been - already in Greek philosophy - a source 
of contention (Klauer et al. 2017: Chapter 8). To understand and analyze the interplay 
between nature and the economy, we need a broad view of time since we have to consider 
short, medium and in particular long-term repercussions. Hence, we have to structure the 
flow of time. What then is an appropriate concept of time? A good starting point to get an 
idea of temporal structures is the concept of evolution. Evolutionary economists (e.g. 
Nelson and Winter 1982) started their research in the 1960s by following Joseph A. 
Schumpeter’s ideas of evolutionary thought, developed in his seminal work The Theory of 
Economic Development (1934; first published in German in 1912). However, this work had 
little impact on the research of environmental economists. With the development of 
ecological economics in the 1980s, evolution became a key concept (e.g.  Norgaard 1984; 
Faber and Proops in cooperation with Manstetten 1998; Schiller 2002). 
The concept of evolution is fruitful for the interaction between nature and the economy 
because it allows us to combine the structure of time with concepts such as ignorance and 
novelty. “For instance, the concepts of genotype (the gene structure of a living being) and 
phenotype (the realization of a living being) can be employed not just in a biological 
context but also in a physical and economical context. This broad view of evolution is 
useful for two reasons: (i) Several concepts first introduced in natural science are useful 
because they provide economics with a physical foundation. (ii) The way natural science 
has treated time and irreversibility offers important lessons to economics, for many 
economic actions have irreversible consequences, like the use of groundwater which cannot 
be replaced if it is extracted too fast.” (Faber et al. 2018: 12) To give an example, the 
invention of a technique can be interpreted as a genotypic change of an economy, while the 
actual realization, the innovation, can be seen as a phenotypic development. As we will see 
in the following Section 3, the time lag between invention and innovation can be rather 
long. 
Individuals, scientists and politicians who are concerned about the environment are 
particularly interested in long-term developments during which novelty, in our terminology 
genotypic change, can unfold; here time, evolution and ignorance are of particular 
relevance. However, “many branches of science tend to conceive of their objects of study 
as rather timeless; they tend to represent their findings in ‘eternal’ laws, such as the Law 
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of Classical Mechanics. The application of such kinds of science easily leads to the belief 
that future events are predictable. This predictability would have been complete for that 
ideal scientist, Laplace’s demon (Prigogine and Stengers 1984). In contrast to this 
approach, we start from the assumption that the objects and their relationships which 
science examines are intrinsically characterized by complete or partial emergence of 
novelty in the course of time. This leads us to develop new concepts to answer this question. 
A key notion for our approach is evolution”. (Faber et al. 2002: 136). 
We employ a general concept of evolution (developed at length in Faber, Proops in 
cooperation with Manstetten 1998: Part II and III) to be able to understand and deal with 
long-term interactions between economic activity and its impact on the environment, and 
vice versa. By employing concepts from biology and physics in addition to economics, we 
can identify the extent to which we can and cannot predict long-term developments. This 
enables us to become aware of our ignorance and to incorporate this knowledge explicitly 
into our theorizing and policies, which is particularly relevant for environmental policy 
making. 
Knowledge, Novelty and Ignorance 
Focusing our attention on our ignorance instead of our knowledge creates a decisive shift 
in economic theory and environmental policy. When dealing with an environmental 
problem, we often notice that we do not know whether we are able to solve it or not. One 
reason for this state of affairs is that we are not aware of what we can know and what we 
cannot know. To clarify this important question, an analysis of ignorance is needed. We 
have dealt with this epistemological question in Faber, Manstetten, Proops (1992a; 
1992b)2, where we develop a classification with eight forms of ignorance. A deepened 
understanding of ignorance yields new attitudes towards environmental problems: attitudes 
of openness and flexibility instead of control and inflexibility.  
Knight (1921) differentiated between ‘risk’ and ‘uncertainty’. Risk occurs when not only 
all possible outcomes are known, but also their probabilities. In the case of uncertainty, 
only the outcomes but not their probabilities are known. Ignorance occurs if we do not 
know the outcomes in advance. To give an example: Most people were ignorant concerning 
the catastrophe in Fukushima in Japan in 2011. 
In contrast to risk and uncertainty, ignorance has not yet received the attention it deserves 
in economics. Or, as Hayek (1972: 33, our translation) put it: “Perhaps it is only natural 
that the circumstances which limit our factual knowledge and the ensuing limits to applying 
                                                     
2  See as well: Faber, Manstetten, Proops, 1998: chapter 11; Faber, Proops in cooperation 
with Reiner Manstetten 1998: chapter 7; Faber, Manstetten 2010: Chapter 4, see also 
Funtovicz & Ravetz 1991; Smithon 1988. In contrast to these authors, we shall place 
special emphasis on aspects of time and evolution, for our special interest has been 
evolutionary problems in a broad sense, including environmental questions as particular 
cases. 
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our theoretical knowledge go rather unnoticed in the exuberance which has been brought 
about by the successful progress of science. However, it is high time that we took our 
ignorance [our emphasis] more seriously.” 
In the following Sections 3 and 4 we shall employ several forms of ignorance from our 
classification referred to above. Important for our argumentation below are the following:  
 Individual and social ignorance: Ignorance can be ascribed to the individual, a 
community or even a society. In the first case, we speak of personal or individual 
ignorance because the required information is generally available within a society 
but unknown to the individual. The second falls into the category of social 
ignorance, i.e. the required information is unavailable not only on an individual 
level but also to the society. These types of ignorance can be reduced by learning 
on a personal level and by science on a communal level (Faber et al. 1998: 116).  
 Closed and open ignorance. We speak of closed ignorance whenever we are 
unaware of our ignorance. The possibility of risk, uncertainty and surprise remains 
unexpected in this case. In contrast to closed ignorance, open ignorance occurs 
when individuals, communities or societies are aware of it and are in a state of 
openness towards their ignorance (ibid.: 116f).   
 Reducible and irreducible ignorance: Reducible ignorance can be overcome by 
learning and by science. In contrast to that, irreducible ignorance cannot be 
reduced by the accumulation of knowledge (ibid.: 118f) 
In the following, we link the concept of ignorance with the concepts of joint production 
and responsibility. The consequences of joint products for the environment need to be taken 
into account, as do the responsibility of economic and social actors for dealing with those 
consequences. To be responsible, however, requires the ability to foresee the consequences 
of one’s actions, as we will explain in Section 4. Thus, responsibility raises the problem of 
the limits of knowledge and, in turn, of ignorance.  
Joint Production 
The notion of joint production describes the phenomenon that several outputs necessarily 
emerge from economic activity3. It can “capture the essential thermodynamic constraints 
of production processes, as expressed by the First and Second Laws of thermodynamics, 
through an easy-to-use and easy-to-understand economic concept. This holds for 
production in both economic systems and ecosystems. Joint production, therefore, is also 
a fundamental notion in ecology even though it is not often expressed as such in that 
discipline. Organisms and ecosystems as open, self-organizing systems, necessarily take in 
several inputs and generate several outputs, just as an economy does. Indeed, such natural 
systems are the earliest examples of joint production.” (Baumgärtner et al. 2006: 5). In 
                                                     
3 Georg Müller-Fürstenberger (1995) conducted a pioneering theoretical and empirical 
study on joint production in the chemical industry. 
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summary, joint products are an essential element to formulate the biophysical constraints 
of economic activity. They relate to the repercussions of production and consumption on 
the environment.  
The occurrence of joint production has been well known since the beginnings of 
agricultural activity; an example is sheep farming: A sheep does not only yield milk, but 
also wool and finally meat. All sectors of modern economies are characterized by joint 
production. This is particularly true in the chemical industry where many of the joint 
products are useful. But in the meantime, everyone knows that joint production, as for 
example the production of steel, yields unwanted goods, so called bads, such as dust, waste 
water, slug, CO2, which are unwanted because they damage the environment.   
“The power and generality of joint production can be demonstrated through the way it 
embraces four central issues in ecological economics: irreversibility, limits to substitution, 
the ubiquity of waste, and the limits of growth” (ibid.: 5)4.  
There exists a close relationship between joint production, responsibility and ignorance as 
will be shown in Section 3 below.  
Responsibility 
Responsibility is a ubiquitous phenomenon. The concept of responsibility broadens the 
scope of our economic investigation to incorporate an ethical perspective which is based 
on philosophical reasoning. This is particularly important since “economic activity 
generally produces two kinds of output: the intended principal product and unintended by-
products. We would expect, and indeed observe, that producers will focus their attention 
and energies on the former, while the latter will be largely ignored, at least to the extent 
permitted by legal constraints and social mores. This inattention to the undesired products 
raises two issues of a philosophical nature, one relating to responsibility, that is ethical, and 
one relating to knowledge that is epistemological.” (ibid.: 7-8).  
What is responsibility? It links the consequences of an action to the actor. There are several 
forms of responsibility (see ibid.: Part III). In everyday life, the distinction between moral 
and legal responsibility is well known. Less familiar is the distinction between individual 
and collective responsibility. One form of the latter is political responsibility. 
“Ascribing responsibility in this differentiated way helps to reduce complexity, for it shows 
who is responsible for what and to what extent. This allows us to distinguish between 
reality and wishful thinking” (Faber et al. 2018: 15). 
Responsibility is also an important notion for the understanding of the concepts of homo 
oeconomicus and homo politicus, for these two pictures of humankind are characterized by 
different ranges of responsibility: Homo oeconomicus is responsible for his own concerns 
                                                     
4 For more details see Baumgärtner et al. (2006: 5f.) and Baumgärtner (2000). 
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and his compliance with legal limits. Homo politicus, in contrast assumes responsibility for 
the good state of the community and its sustainable orientation (Faber, Manstetten, Petersen 
1997).  
Power of Judgment 
Power of judgment is a certain capability which cannot be taught, but can only be learned 
by experience. “In contrast to the discursive reasoning of mind, the judgments of the power 
of judgment are not necessarily logically consistent, each time repeatable and necessary 
(Kant 1960.II: 184). The judgments of the power of judgment do not fulfill the latter three 
conditions since they have an irrevocable element of freedom and spontaneity and refer 
strongly to practical knowledge based on everyday experiences” (Petersen et al. 2000: 141-
142; our translation). 
The concept of power of judgment has a long history in philosophy. As early as antiquity 
it was analyzed at length by Aristotle during the 4th century B.C. Its revival came with the 
seminal work of Immanuel Kant in the 18th century. As Kant put it, “We need judgment 
when we wish to make practical use of or follow a theory. […] Thus judgment must 
‘subsume’ specific or practical circumstances under rules and concepts. This is necessary 
when action needs to occur” (Klauer et al. 2017: 99). We illustrate this statement with the 
famous quote by Martin Luther: “Here I stand, I cannot do otherwise. God help me, Amen!” 
(Faber, Manstetten 2010: 65; see also 64-67). 
Power of judgment was a prominent concept in economics during the 18th and 19th 
centuries. However, it fell into oblivion in economics when mathematics started to be 
increasingly employed over the course of the 20th century.  It had its renaissance in 
Ecological Economics at the end of the last century, for environmental politics needs this 
concept to a considerable extent (Klauer et al. 2017: chapter 8-10; Petersen, Faber, Schiller 
2000), as we will show in Section 5.  
Homo Oeconomicus and Homo Politicus 
The concept of the homo oeconomicus is perhaps the most central assumption of economics 
because it is still a central pillar of economic theory. However, it is claimed by Behavioural 
Economics as well as various heterodox economic approaches that this concept of human 
behavior in economics is not as relevant empirically as assumed in major economics 
textbooks. As argued by ecological economists, the major reliance on the homo 
oeconomicus is a hindrance in achieving a sustainable policy, for it undermines individual 
beliefs in a good society and because the homo oeconomicus is solely self-centered 
(Petersen and Faber 2001). 
Nevertheless, this concept captures one important trait of human beings, their self-
orientation. For this reason, the concept enables scientists to gain valuable insights into 
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economic behavior and even to a certain extent into political behavior, which form the basis 
for economic policies (Downs 1957).  
Behavioral economics and heterodox approaches hold that the concept of the homo 
oeconomicus has not to be substituted but supplemented with other conceptions of humans. 
In this paper, we propose as an additional dimension of human behavior the concept of 
homo politicus. The roots of homo politicus originate from Political Philosophy, in 
particular from Aristotle, Kant and Hegel (see e.g. Faber, Manstetten, Petersen 1997 and 
Faber, Petersen, Schiller 2002; Hottinger 1998; Manstetten, Hottinger, Faber 1998).  
The homo politicus is interested in justice, the common good, and in sustainability of 
natural living conditions. A major difference between the homo oeconomicus and the homo 
politicus is that the former is limited to a short-term time perspective, while the latter has 
a long-term one too. That perspective enables her/him to care also for long-term interests, 
in particular for securing the sustainability of the natural living conditions. Facing the 
complexity of novelty and ignorance linked to a long-term perspective, the homo politicus 
requires a particular faculty in order to make good decisions, the faculty of power of 
judgment. 
We note in passing that the empirical relevance of the concept of homo politicus was shown 
in Petersen and Faber (2000). 
3. The case study of the Soda-Chlorine Industry 
In this section, we apply the concepts introduced – absolute and relative scarcity; 
evolution; ignorance; joint production; responsibility; power of judgment and homo 
oeconomicus and homo politicus – to an example from history and examine the theoretical 
and practical insights that can be obtained from them. 
Applying the different scientific concepts dealt with in Section 2 above can be challenging, 
especially since they originate from very different disciplines. In order to facilitate an 
understanding, we will illustrate them with a case from industrial history. The history of 
the soda-chlorine industry exemplarily shows the close connection between the 
development of an industrial structure, scarcity of natural resources, environmental 
pollution and the reactions of economic agents and politics (see Müller-Fürstenberger 
1995:179-221; Baumgärtner et al. 2006: 292-306). The soda-chlorine industry has been of 
great economic significance because in the 20th century this industry made up about 60%, 
of Germany's chemical industry and was thus an important driver of economic growth. 
We use its history to show the effects of the use of natural resources, of inventions and 
innovations of new technologies and their repercussions. It can be shown that new 
techniques were implemented to deal with scarcity of production factors, that 
environmental pollution was caused by these new technologies, which in turn lead to new 
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inventions and innovations in order to avoid pollution. This process, initiated by 
individuals, institutions and politics, also created new goods which in turn caused new 
environmental damage and new reactions, both in terms of business and politics. The 
creativity of scientists, inventers, economic actors and the effective regulations by 
politicians, who assumed their responsibility for the protection of the public, are the driving 
forces for this evolution. We note that a key to understanding this development is its long 
time frame which leads to the occurrence of novelty and ignorance that have to be dealt 
with by individual and collective, economic and political actors over the course of time. 
The corresponding time frame takes us from the middle of the 18th century to the middle 
of the 21st century, i.e. means we shall deal with a time frame of about 300 years. 
From potash to synthetic soda 
The textile industry is called “the mother of the industry” because it was the first economic 
activity in history that can be termed an “industry”. The most important production factor 
for bleaching was so-called potash; it was obtained by burning wood. For one ton of potash, 
for instance, 1400 tons of birch wood had to be burned. This demand quickly led to 
deforestation. The production factor wood became absolutely scarce.   
For this reason, potash had to be replaced by natural soda, which, however, had to be 
imported from Egypt or Spain. In Spain, it was obtained from Barilla, salt tolerant plants 
that became the primary source for soda ash. When soda from Egypt became absolutely 
scarce and the sea blockade of the British navy stopped the import of Barilla from Spain 
in the 1760s and 1770s, this led to an increasing scarcity of soda on the European continent. 
Facing this situation of social ignorance concerning the substitution of natural sources of 
soda, the French Academy decided to offer a prize for the invention of the synthetic 
production of soda in 1775. This can be seen as an intervention by a social institution; thus 
a collective actor assumed responsibility in order to overcome a situation which was not 
solved by the market. It took 16 years until this prize was awarded to Nicholas Leblanc in 
1791. He had invented the so called Leblanc process, thus novelty occurred.  
Only in 1822, i.e. 31 years after its invention, the Leblanc process was finally innovated in 
a way that allowed it to be implemented on a large scale in the industry. The scarcity of 
natural soda was overcome by the manufacturing of synthetic soda. This innovation was 
triggered by economic actors behaving according to the homo oeconomicus model. This 
development illustrates the importance of the concepts scarcity, ignorance, homo politicus, 
responsibility, economic evolution, novelty and homo politicus, as it will be described in 
more detail is Section 4 below.  
Leblanc process, pollution and Chlorine Alkali Bill 
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While up to now we took an economic and a social perspective when talking about scarcity 
and the way it was overcome, in a next step we turn to an aspect of production that requires 
the natural sciences. The solution of the situation of scarcity was an economic and social 
success, but it demanded its price since the production of synthetic soda in the Leblanc 
process led to the occurrence of joint products. The production of 100kg of soda was 
accompanied by the production of 69 kg hydrogen chloride (HCL), 68 kg of calcium 
sulphides (CaS) and 83kg of carbon dioxide (CO2) (see Müller-Fürstenberger 1995:182; 
Baumgärtner et al. 2006b: 293-299). The first two joint products, HCL and CaS created 
serious social problems and caused damage in the economic system (for details see: ibid.: 
294-295). We see that this chemical process necessarily leads not only to unwanted, but 
also harmful joint products. This illustrates the relevance of natural sciences for an 
appropriate analysis of economic-environmental interactions. We observe how over time, 
the solution of a problem of economic scarcity generated a new problem: pollution of air 
that endangered humans, animals and plants. The consequences of this pollution became 
more and more of a problem. This led to public social resistance in the beginning of the 
1830s. Here, people stood up and assumed their individual and finally politicians their 
political responsibility. Again it took a long time until politics reacted and passed 
legislation, the Chlorine Alkali Bill from 1864. This political intervention, an act of 
political responsibility, turns out to be a new element within the process of social, economic 
and environmental evolution.   
As a result of the Chlorine Alkali Bill, the industrial producers were obliged to convert 
hydrogen chloride to hydrochloride acid, which they released into rivers and lakes. So 
instead of polluting the air, water was used as a receptor of pollutants and was thus 
subsequently polluted. This resulted in the death of fishes in lakes and rivers and the 
corroding of economic assets such as metal boats and sluice gates, consequences people 
were unaware of – a case of social ignorance. 10 years later, renewed public resistance as 
a result of individual and social responsibility led to the amendment of the Chlorine Alkali 
Bill in 1874 which regulated the introduction of fluid waste as well. Politicians had finally 
assumed their political responsibility. 
Deacon process – a next step in evolution 
The pressure exerted by the public, initiated intense research, even before introduction of 
the legislative amendment of 1874. The result of the research was the invention of the so-
called Deacon Process of 1869. Within the Deacon process, a new type of novelty occurs: 
Its innovation has made it possible to convert a bad, hydrochloride acid (HCL), into a 
highly desirable good – pure chlorine. Again, social ignorance evolved into novelty and 
thus into knowledge. The British chemist Henry Deacon as well as those economic actors 
who invested in and innovated the new technology acted as homines oeconomici. But they 
were driven not only by economic motives, but also by the demand of the public for 
solutions to the pollution problem. Individuals and social groups maintained the high 
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pressure over a long period of time, and their success on a legislative level shows that they 
were driven by social responsibility and power of judgment. Hence, these individuals and 
social groups acted as homines politici. Pure chlorine, produced thanks to the Deacon 
process, was a good in such high demand that its production became more important. So 
ultimately, chlorine turned into the main product and soda the by-product. 
At first glance, it seems as if the problem of resource scarcity had not only been overcome, 
but a bad (HCL) had even been transformed into a very valuable good. Thus, challenges 
led to economic progress: An undesired and poisonous joint product led to socio-political 
and legal demand for change, which in turn led to strong incentives to overcome a 
technological and environmental status quo. In short, technical progress was able to 
overcome a severe economic and environmental problem and at the same time contribute 
to economic welfare through the production of pure chlorine.  
We conclude that the emergence of resource scarcity and pollutants as a result of joint 
products can be seen as a trigger for inventions and innovations. Ignorance concerning 
technical progress in terms of novelty had positive and negative effects. While the positive 
effects were a result of creativity in the market, negative effects could not be solved by the 
market, but only by politics.   
CFCs: the destruction of the ozone layer  
The solution for the pollution by hydrogen chlorine (HCL) appeared to be a story of success 
for almost a century. One major aspect of it was the development of chlorofluorocarbons 
(CFCs). Shortly after the invention of the Deacon Process in 1869, CFCs were created 
experimentally around 1870. CFCs had many favorable characteristics: They were not 
poisonous, they were nonflammable and could be used for very different purposes, in 
particular for heat isolators and cooling. Therefore, they became an indispensable part of 
everyday life. Mass production of CFCs started from the 1930s onwards. In 1974, 700,000 
tons of CFCs were produced and 350,000 tons were emitted from refrigerators, freezers, 
cold storage facilities and refrigerator-transportation units and as propellants in spray cans.  
In 1985, however, it was discovered that the CFCs rise into the stratosphere (12 to 35 km 
over the earth’s surface) and damage or even destroy the ozone layer. This discovery of the 
amount of destruction came as a complete surprise to scientists and a shock (ignorance) to 
the public and politicians.  
The shock was even greater since it was forecasted that it would take until 2050 for the 
ozone layer to restore itself to the concentration levels of 1970. The proposed necessary 
reduction of the CFCs in the course of about 65 years was achieved by a worldwide 
international agreement, the so called Montreal Protocol of 1989. The time span between 
the invention of the CFCs and the elimination of their damaging effects expands over 
almost two centuries. Once again, political responsibility, this time on a global scale, was 
needed in order to deal with negative effects caused by polluting joint products. 
13 
 
The phenomenon of the CFCs makes evident the long-term time frame which has to be 
taken into account in this case. Ignorance and joint production are challenges that require 
joint action by creative actors: homo oeconomicus, scientists and actors with a long-run 
mindset and a sense of political responsibility and power of judgment such as homo 
politicus.   
4. Lessons about the temporal structure of economic environmental 
interactions, ignorance, scope and actors of the problems and their 
solutions 
In the last section we have illustrated how the concepts explained in Section 2 above help 
us to theoretically grasp, systematically investigate and understand an empirical example 
from the field of complex nature-economy interactions as well as political reactions in 
reality. We have attempted to explain how 
 the terms and concepts introduced in Section 2 capture the emergence and temporal 
structure of economic and environmental interactions,  
 their short-term solutions,  
 the ignorance related to them and the repetition of this sequence when further 
problems arise from these solutions in the long run,  
 n this process, economic as well as social and political actors are involved.  
 These actors can be connected with the various triggers for the economic, social 
environmental and political evolution we have encountered in our historical 
example. 
 
For ease of representation, it may be useful to describe this evolution, highlighting not only 
the corresponding concepts but also the relevant actors, in five consecutive stages:  
1. The scarcity of production factor wood leads to substitution efforts (1750-1822, from 
potash to imported natural soda and Barilla). Here, an economic problem is solved by 
economic actors via the market system.  
2. Renewed scarcity of soda leads to inventions and innovations. The question how to deal 
with absolute scarcity of soda in 1775 led to the announcement of a prize for an invention 
of synthetic soda by the French Academy. The Leblanc process was invented in 1791 but 
not innovated until 1822, thus leading to a substitution of imported natural soda and Barilla 
by synthetic soda.  
Here an economic problem was solved by economic and scientific actors via a social 
institution (homo politicus), providing the necessary incentives to promote the invention 
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made available by science and leading to its subsequent innovation via the market by homo 
oeconomicus.   
3. However, there existed social ignorance concerning the environmental consequences 
of the Leblanc process. In the course of time, social resistance by homines politici arose 
against the effect of the pollution of the HCL caused by consequences of joint products of 
the Leblanc process. They affected people's health and led to a political reaction which 
initiated a change in the production process over the course of time (1864, Chlorine Alkali 
Bill).   
4. There existed social ignorance concerning the environmental consequences of the 
Chlorine Alkali Bill. Social resistance by homines politici arose against the effect of the 
pollution caused by joint products in the water which affected people's health and economic 
activities. A call for action articulated by society and jointly by consumers (homines 
politici) and producers (homines oeconominici) led to the invention of the Deacon Process 
in 1869 and to the amendment of the Chlorine Alkali Bill in 1874. The innovation of the 
Deacon Process caused a very important novelty: A polluting substance, HCL, became the 
basis for a completely new and very valuable product, pure chlorine. 
5.  In the 1970s, CFCs were invented. In 1930, this invention was innovated, enabling the 
mass production of CFCs. Again, there was social ignorance concerning the health effects 
of the use of the CFCs, for their potential health dangers were only recognized in 1974 and 
the causal relationship between damage to the ozone layer and skin cancer was not 
discovered until 1985 .  This came as a great surprise, not only to the public but also to 
science. Due to the great danger,  a ban on CFCs was agreed on internationally in the 
Montreal Protocol. It was predicted that this ban would lead to the reduction of CFC levels 
in the atmosphere, restoring the levels of 1970 by 2050.  
This problem was first discovered and articulated by scientists and physicians. Their 
demand for a solution as well as demands by social actors (homines politici) led to an 
international political regulation and the substitution of CFCs.  
In four of these five cases, it is not the market (and therefore not homo oeconomicus) that 
provides the impetus for change, but social and political forces (and thus homo politicus) 
that set incentives for evolution in the form of legal regulations. Individuals act collectively 
(the protesters) and politics ultimately assume responsibility for regulating and changing 
an economic process with negative joint products.  
This call for politicians to assume responsibility and enact appropriate regulations is also a 
well-known phenomenon in the current debate on the environment. In the following, we 
want to use our concepts to show what needs to be known about the problem and who can 
and should take responsibility for action in general.  
5. Approaching the ethical core of the environmental problem 
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The complexity of environmental problems results from the fact that they are multi-layered. 
At its core, it is an ethical problem, but the natural sciences and the economy hold essential 
restrictions for any solutions. We consider the concept of responsibility to be an operational 
approach to come to grips with this ethical problem in practice.  
In the context of environmental problems, the concept of responsibility, though often 
mentioned, is not often applied in public in an unambiguous manner.  
Three central questions are: 
 Who is responsible for the causation of environmental problems?  
 Who is responsible for taking appropriate measures in the future? 
 Who are the addressees for these two questions? 
Our search for answers to these questions has been inspired by the seminal work The 
Imperative of Responsibility. In Search of an Ethics for the Technological Age by Hans 
Jonas. He turned to the concept of responsibility because he realized how challenging the 
various problems of the technological age were for classical ethical approaches (Jonas 
1979: 222). The ability of humans to influence and damage the natural foundation of life 
was unknown in the context of traditional ethics in earlier times. Nature was considered to 
be outside the realm of human action. Jonas’ approach is to reformulate the classical term 
of responsibility in the context of environmental destruction. He developed an “imperative 
of responsibility” that basically augments the obligation of humans to preserve the natural 
environment as it is the foundation of human existence (see Jonas 1979: 36; Baumgärtner 
et al. 2006b: 226; Becker et al. 2015). The root of this obligation lies in the power given to 
human beings by technology and the potentially destructive dynamics generated by it. 
Jonas formulates in the first two sentences of his preface of the German edition:  
“When Prometheus was finally unleashed and given unprecedented force by science and 
relentless momentum by the economy, this called for an ethic by which he voluntarily 
restrains his power to prevent calamity to mankind. The transformation of the promise of 
modern technology into a threat, or its inextricable ties to it, form the starting point of this 
book.” (Jonas 1979:7, our translation). 
Jonas sees clearly that freedom and power are linked to responsibility since only a person 
who acts freely can be called responsible for her actions and their consequences (Jonas 
1979: 232; Baumgärtner et al. 2006b: 226). 
In the following we want to complement the insights of Jonas by making use of the 
concepts explained in Section 2. We do this by closely connecting the concept of 
responsibility to the concepts of joint production and ignorance. This helps to understand 
how environmental problems emerge and how the characteristics of their occurrence shape 
the way they can be addressed in a responsible and sustainable manner. 
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Once we have developed this understanding, we propose the homo politicus, characterized 
by the ability of power of judgment as the actor who practically assumes this responsibility 
(see Baumgärtner et al. 2006b).  
5.1 Individual responsibility 
First, we ask what responsibility means beyond its manifold uses in everyday life. 
Responsibility expresses a causal connection: Whoever is responsible for an act can be 
ascribed to this act and its consequences. No consequences immediately result from this 
causal ascription for the actor. Beyond the mere attribution, this "causal power" as Jonas 
calls it, may have legal consequences and may have moral consequences. An essential 
precondition for these consequences is the freedom of an individual: “Responsibility means 
that one is the perpetrator of one’s deeds. A person can determine his will freely; he is free 
to determine his aim of acting and to do something in order to realize this aim” 
(Baumgärtner et al. 2006b: 226).  Hence, an individual who acts freely might be held 
responsible for something legally and morally as well. This means that he can be made 
"liable" for the action and its consequences on a legal level and has to accept that his actions 
and its consequences are judged by others as “morally good” or “morally bad” (Jonas 1979: 
172; Baumgärtner et al. 2006b: 226f).  
What does this mean for the responsibility an individual has to assume? This question can 
be answered by referring to negative and positive responsibility. In terms of negative 
responsibility, a freely acting individual is obliged to refrain from actions that cause harm 
to others. Anyone who assumes negative responsibility acts in accordance with this 
obligation. 
Those who assume positive responsibility extend this obligation to refrain from harmful 
acts and commit themselves to take care of the good condition of those for whom they 
declare themselves responsible. Positive responsibility does not only mean the omission of 
harmful actions but also working actively towards a good condition. 
 
Joint production and ignorance as limits of individual responsibility 
As noted above, freedom is a necessary condition for responsibility. “Responsibility is the 
flip-side to a human being’s freedom to act. A person is only the author and master of his 
actions insofar as he can assume responsibility for his actions and their consequences. That 
for which someone assumes responsibility can be ascribed to him […] thus, only he who 
can assume responsibility is actually capable of taking concrete action. This raises the 
question of the extent of one’s responsibility” (Baumgärtner et al. 2006b: 229). An 
individual who is not free cannot assume responsibility for his deeds. 
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A second necessary condition for responsibility is the ability to acquire the available 
knowledge in society about the consequences of one’s actions. Individual 
ignorance does not necessarily protect an individual against legal punishment. However, 
whenever this knowledge cannot be acquired, responsibility cannot be assumed (for a 
detailed analysis see ibid: 230f). Thus, it may occur that joint production is connected with 
irreducible ignorance. In contexts of high complexity, for example in the case of CFCs 
explained in Sections 3 and 4 above, there was no knowledge of the joint products or their 
negative consequences. Individuals as well as society were in a state of closed ignorance 
because no one was aware that possible negative joint products existed concerning the use 
of CFCs. Hence, neither the individuals nor society can be ascribed moral or legal 
responsibility (ibid. 229-233).  
Hence, the question is: Who assumes responsibility in this case? We will turn to the answer 
in Section 5.4. 
5.2 The scope of political responsibility 
Returning to Hans Jonas, we find that he gives politics a special position in the area of 
responsibility: He speaks of a duty of power and the associated responsibility for 
something: "Yet there is a completely different concept of responsibility which does not 
concern the ex-post facto reckoning of what has been done, but rather the determination 
what is to be done. Accordingly, I therefore do not feel primarily responsible for my 
behavior or its consequences but instead for the thing which lays claim to my actions.” 
(Jonas 1979:174, our translation). 
Where does this new form of responsibility come from and how is it justified? Jonas argues 
that the voluntary will to power and its assumption becomes an obligation. 
Political power extends the sphere of influence beyond individual borders and thus also the 
sphere of responsibility. This extended kind of influence is found in the ability to change 
the legal framework of action and the incentive structures for individuals, economic actors 
and communities by means of laws and political measures. This influence of politics has 
been illustrated in the history of the soda chlorine industry by the Chlorine Alkali Act, its 
amendment and the Montreal Protocol (see Sections 3 and 4).   
In contrast to the private individual, politicians have far more access to the available social 
knowledge since they can rely on science, expert committees and specific studies. Hence, 
they are not restricted to the same extent as individuals. Nevertheless, politicians are 
confronted with irreducible ignorance. Since political responsibility assumes 
responsibility for the good state of society, politicians are nevertheless obliged to make 
good decisions when they are confronted with complexity and irreducible ignorance 
(Baumgärtner et al. 2006b: chapter 14). 
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5.3 Power of judgment as a concept of how to deal with political 
responsibility 
How should politicians live up to this responsibility? First of all, political actors must be 
aware that they are assuming a positive responsibility for something (a department, a 
ministry, a region or a country and its people). This responsibility means that they are 
committed to creating and maintaining the good state of this "something". In order to fulfill 
this obligation, especially in the context of environmental issues, it is essential to develop 
an understanding of the complexity, a knowledge of the emergence of absolute and relative 
scarcity as well as evolution, joint products and the three forms of ignorance.  
Taking on political responsibility then means acting in the face of these difficulties and 
being able to make, while not best, good decisions. Since politicians are confronted with 
different contexts, i.e. every problem they face is different from the one they faced before, 
they cannot rely on general rules but have to find a new solution for every context. To be 
able to develop these solutions, they have to rely on the faculty of power of judgment. 
Power of judgment understood as knowing how: Judgment knows how to deal with 
concepts such as the ones mentioned above and how to apply them to specific contexts and 
cases (see Klauer et al. 2017: 107).  
5.4 The homo politicus as an actor of political responsibility 
Unlike the homo oeconomicus, the homo politicus is not exclusively interested in its own 
welfare but in the good condition of the whole, the political community (a department, a 
ministry, a region or a country), and the common good.  
“Homo politicus looks for solutions that are firstly objectively measured and secondly find 
a consensus in the long term, i.e. the de facto agreement of the actors and interests involved 
and affected. In pursuit of this goal, homo politicus will not sacrifice its own welfare but 
will nevertheless put its own interests - including those in the gain of personal power - in 
the back seat if necessary. 
But in order to achieve this goal - the agreement of actors with often quite different interests 
- homo politicus must be able to understand these interests or the perspectives of the 
respective interested actors. This ability is the prerequisite for homo politicus to be able to 
judge, decide and act in such a way as to meet  the approval of these actors who are affected 
by the decision and action of homo politicus” (Faber, Petersen, Schiller 2002, our 
translation).  
“In the power of judgment and the action of homo politicus determined by it, we therefore 
have an element of unpredictability. Because this action can change both laws and 
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institutional framework conditions of the economy as well as norms and preferences, it 
represents a possible source of evolutionary change” (ibid, our translation) and hence an 
element of irreducible ignorance. 
To be able to do this, the homo politicus has to find means to achieve his aim and make 
sure that it is realized. This requires the willingness and courage to do what is recognized 
as right and to take on personal risks and disadvantages (ibid.). 
6. Outlook  
We owe the essential line of our argumentation in this paper to decades of interdisciplinary 
research at Heidelberg University.5 In our scientific work6, we repeatedly had the 
experience that it is not so crucial to simply accumulate knowledge. Rather, we found it to 
be important to systematically structure the available knowledge by assigning it to more 
general concepts. For example, economic activity can be described by the concept of joint 
production and its repercussions on the environment; the behavior of actors can be 
categorized by the concepts of homo oeconomicus and homo politicus. Temporal 
developments can be described by our concept of evolution, Neo-Austrian capital theory 
(Faber 1979, Stephan 1995), Faber, Proops, Speck (1999) and a theory of stocks (Faber, 
Frank, Klauer, Manstetten, Schiller, Wissel 2005; Klauer et al. 2017, Parts II to IV).  
We also found that concepts like joint production and responsibility allow us to gain 
essential insight into the physical, economic and the ethical side of production, since they 
have a structural relatedness (Baumgärtner et al. 2006b: 223-267).  
With this in mind, we have directed our attention once again to the development of such 
structural relatedness; in this way we have generated new concepts and methods (see e.g. 
Faber, Manstetten, and Proops 1998). Our overriding question has been: How does the 
economy interact with nature and vice versa? This question can be refined and applied as 
a theoretical perspective to environmental policy areas such as waste, water, CO2 and 
biodiversity.7  
                                                     
5 This research has been published in printed media such as books and journals. 
Additionally, a summarized and systemized version of this material has been published as 
a website: www.nature-economy.de 
Furthermore, a discussion paper reflecting on the process, methodology and content of this 
website has been published by Faber, Petersen, Frick and Zahrnt (2018). 
6 This endeavour was motivated by our advising activities for national and international 
governmental bodies on environmental policy over the course of four decades. These 
activities have accompanied our scientific research from 1980 to the present. This 
engagement has made us aware of scientific gaps.  
7 See for waste: Faber, Stephan, Michaelis (1989); for water: Faber,  Niemes, Stephan, 
(1983); Jöst et al. (2006); Niemes and Schirmer (2010); for CO2 and climate change: Proops 
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Asking these questions is one way of developing a perspective and approaching the 
respective fields and concrete cases. It is certainly not the only way. The concrete examples 
of waste, water, CO2 and biodiversity and the corresponding scientific literature show how 
many other approaches there are, because each of these areas demands the recognition of 
its context and the different questions asked. And yet we believe that our conceptual 
approach with a systematic order of knowledge and the elaboration of relatedness between 
the individual concepts and areas of knowledge represents a perspective of its own. In 
practical terms, “practical in the sense of practical philosophy which concerns itself with 
human action, this means that these fields can only be understood through science which 
is accessed through simpler overarching concepts. These concepts do not form a 
hierarchically structured system within our approach. Instead they are conceived as a 
network of interdependent concepts that reference each other but also remain categorically 
distinct from one another” (Faber et al. 2018: 6).   
We argue that the systematization of the necessary existing knowledge is an important 
success factor for environmental policy. This line of argument is reinforced by current 
digital developments, for an incredible amount of knowledge is readily available in a few 
clicks. Paradoxically, however, people do not perceive this knowledge as a reduction in 
complexity but as an ever growing overload.8  
In this paper, we have employed six general concepts to analyze environmental problems, 
to reduce complexity, and to offer theoretical and practical considerations to approach 
them. In addition to the six concepts in this paper, our approach includes nine others (Faber 
et al 2018). Of course, many more such general concepts exist, like resilience9, flexibility, 
freedom, will10 and consent which we consider promising.  
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